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UTJECAJ AUTENTIČNOG VODSTVA NA PSIHOLOŠKI KAPITAL
ZAPOSLENIKA U UGOSTITELJSTVU
Sanda Grudić Kvasić, Gordana Nikolić & Vedran Milojica
Sažetak
Psihološki kapital se smatra okosnicom teorije autentičnog vodstva. Važnost i
rastuća popularnost psihološkog kapitala proizlaze iz njegovog pozitivnog učinka na
poželjne stavove i ponašanja zaposlenika, što je posebno izraženo u uslužnim 
djelatnostima. Međutim, empirijska istraživanja odnosa između autentičnog vodstva i
psihološkog kapitala u ugostiteljstvu su malobrojna. U tom smislu, ova studija istražuje
utjecaj autentičnog vodstva na psihološki kapital hotelskih zaposlenika, dodatno
ispitujući moderirajuću ulogu organizacijske strukture. Testiranje hipoteza rada je 
izvršeno primjenom hijerarhijske višestruke regresijske analize na uzorku od 226
anketnih upitnika, prikupljenih u 24 hotela na području Republike Hrvatske. Rezultati
istraživanja su potvrdili da menadžeri koji demonstriraju autentično ponašanje mogu
pozitivno utjecati na psihološke sposobnosti nade, optimizma, otpornosti i 
samoefikasnosti zaposlenika u hotelima. S druge strane, pretpostavljeni moderirajući 
učinak organskih organizacijskih struktura u spomenutom odnosu nije potvrđen.
Ključne riječi: autentično vodstvo; psihološki kapital; ugostiteljstvo; pozitivno
organizacijsko ponašanje.
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Summary 
The paper brings an empirical research of various elements as explanatory 
factors of business environment reforms. Using the panel data model, the paper 
investigates the effects of macroeconomic conditions, political institutions and 
international factors on business environment reforms. The econometric analysis is 
performed on a panel dataset of European Union member states for the period between 
1995 and 2017. Additionally, by clustering countries into new and old EU member states, 
analysis was also conducted for these two sub-panels. The obtained results confirm that 
business environment reforms depend on a number of factors, and that these differ 
between old and new EU member states. 
Keywords: business environment; product market reforms; European Union; 
NMS, EU15. 
1. INTRODUCTION
In order to increase productivity, employment and competitiveness in European 
Union (EU), some critical measures will have to be implemented. The 2008 economic 
crisis, migration crisis and the most recent COVID-19 crisis have more than ever 
aggravated structural problems in EU member states. Even though many reforms in 
product markets have been implemented so far, the level of product market restrictiveness 
still varies considerably across the countries. While existing studies have shown that the 
long-run effects of structural reforms on economic performance are positive, the evidence 
on the short-run effects of structural reforms are relatively mixed and partial (Bordon, 
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Ebeke & Shirono, 2018), which can be attributed to the fact that any reform process is 
under the influence of various economic, institutional and social factors which are 
country-specific.  
 The main goal of this paper is to explore which factors had effect on business 
environment reforms as one part of product reforms in the old (EU15) and new EU 
member countries (NMS). We highlight the significance of the business environment as 
one of the aspect of firm-level competitiveness which is then reflected in the 
competitiveness on national level (as in Kiseľáková et al, 2019). This is in line with 
previous research within which the importance of product market and business 
environment quality and the reforms of it have been intensely empirically tested, and the 
results of which point out to their positive effects on economic development, 
competitiveness and entrepreneurial activity (for a detailed overview of literature see e.g. 
Vučković, Basarac Sertić and Šimić Banović (2016), Anderton, Di Lupidio and Jarmulska 
(2019)).   
 The analysis performed in this paper is based on the Economic Freedom of the 
World of The Fraser Institute database, as well as on OECD PMR indicators. With these 
indicators we focus on measuring the existing distortions in the domain of economic 
policies whereby reforms are measured as the change in the level of such indicators. 
Precisely, a higher value of OECD PMR index indicates more restrictive regulation and 
the introduction of a reform would be represented by a fall of the index, while on the other 
side, an increase in the Fraser Economic Freedom of the World index would imply reform 
implementation.  
 The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we offer descriptive analysis of 
business environment quality in EU member states. Section 3 brings the empirical 
analysis of determinants of business environment reforms in EU countries, with special 
emphasis on investigating whether there are some differences between the old and new 
EU member states. Finally, in Section 4 we conclude.   
 
 
2. BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT IN EU MEMBER STATES 
 
In this paper we analyse business environment reforms as part of product market 
reforms. Precisely, the focus is on the regulatory and administrative aspects of the 
business environment, i.e. the extent to which government policies and regulations define 
the rules of the game for businesses and thus exhibit positive or negative effects on 
businesses through imposing direct and/or indirect costs (see e.g. World Bank, 2013; 
White and Fortune, 2004). In achieving this goal, we employ data from two databases 
often used for analysis of product market regulation and quality of business environment.  
 First, we analyse the OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) indicators which 
combine restrictiveness measures in total of 16 domains of regulation (scaling from 0 – 
6, from least to most restrictive), and which are aggregated into three categories (i.e. state 
control, barriers to entrepreneurship and barriers to trade and investment). The advantage 
of these indicators is that they are objective, transparent and quantifiable (Pelkmans, 
2010). Figure 1 shows data for the overall PMR indicator in 2013 and 2018. The data 
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Figure 1. Product Market Regulation (PMR) indicators (2013 and 2018) 
 
Source: OECD PMR indicators 
 
Figure 2. Distortions induced by state involvement vs. the barriers to the foreign and 
domestic entry 
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Also, on Figure 2 we can see that the distortions and obstacles that are induced 
with the state involvement are much larger than the barriers to the foreign and domestic 
entry (data for 2018).  
Since it is reasonable to expect that the differences in the pace of implemented 
reforms result in an ex-post differences in terms of the overall quality of the business 
environment, we also analyse the index from the Fraser Institute, i.e. Economic Freedom 
of the World. This index measures the degree to which the policies and institutions of 
countries are supportive of economic freedom (Gwartney et al., 2020). The main 
limitation of this index lies in the lack of reliability and transparency of the underlying 
source mainly referring to the opinions of business leaders in many countries, taken from 
the World Competitiveness Report of the WEF (Pelkmans, 2010). Based on the data 
presented in Figure 3, i.e. summary index values for both NMS and EU15, we can 
conclude that the quality of the business environment in terms of economic freedom in 
the new Member States increased during the observed period, especially in the years 
preceding the EU enlargement (2004 and 2007). Although the NMS increased both the 
scope and dynamics of the business environment reforms which contributed to their 
increased business environment quality, there is still a gap in the quality of the business 
environment between the EU15 and NMS when looking the trends in individual sub-
indices contained in the Economic Freedom of the World, i.e. Size of Government, Legal 
System and Property Rights, Sound Money, Freedom to Trade Internationally and 
Regulation (Appendix A.1). 
 
Figure 3. Economic Freedom Summary Index, 1995 - 2018 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from the Fraser Institute data. 
 
The NMS are lagging behind the EU28 average and especially behind the EU15 
in almost all categories. Looking in more detail within the specific dimensions of sub-
indices, particularly the Business regulation, the gap is considerable (Figure 4). This 
dimension is the most closely related to the business environment in the narrow terms 
since it identifies the extent to which regulations and bureaucratic procedures restrain 
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costs, starting a business, extra payments, bribes or favouritism, licensing restrictions and 
costs of tax compliance (The Fraser Institute, 2020). 
 
Figure 4. Business Regulation sub-pillar (EU28=100) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from the Fraser Institute data. 
 
The debates on the causes behind the divergent paths between two groups of 
countries are on-going. Yet the North (1994: 366) has long highlighted that the countries 
that apply formal rules of another country exhibit different performance than these 
countries due to a variety of informal institutions. In this sense, the nominal transfer of 
formal political and economic rules of successful Western economies into Eastern 
European countries (for example, due to meeting the criteria for EU membership) is not 
a sufficient condition for achieving favourable economic performance that would result 
in reducing the previously described gap. Moreover, Liddle (2011) argued that on the one 
hand the Single Market programme facilitated the integration of markets for goods and 
services, which has driven innovation, productivity and economic growth by stimulating 
competition and new possibilities for economies of scale. However, on the other hand, 
according to the author, it also strengthened the set of neoliberal policies without 
simultaneously reforming the extensive socio-economic framework that would enable 
politically acceptable market adjustment and economic change.  
This paper contributes to previous research by conducting the specific 
econometric analysis of factors that determine reform implementation in EU28 countries, 
as well as by examining if there are some differences in such factors between NMS 
(EU13) and EU15 countries. The obtained results could therefore also explain why such 
differences in both the quality of business environment and economic performance arise 
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3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF BUSINESS 
ENVIRONMENT REFORMS IN EU 
 
In general, any reform process is a result of political compromise among the key 
actors, but it is being implemented by the government. As a result of this complexity, the 
theoretical and empirical research on the political economy of reforms so far emphasizes 
six broad categories of potential drivers of reforms. These are (1) the business conditions; 
(2) macroeconomic (monetary and fiscal) policies; (3) structural features of the domestic 
economy (e.g. size, trade openness, demographics, income inequality…); (4) external 
(international) factors; (5) political factors (e.g. ideology, government fragmentation, 
political cycles and crises) and (6) the reform strategies with a goal of overcoming the 
resistance to reform (Duval, Furceri and Miethe, 2018:8). These factors have been 
previously outlined in work of Rodrik (1996), Krueger (1995), Tommasi and Velasco 
(1996), Lora (2000), Drazen (2000), Drazen and Easterly (2001), Olofsgård (2003), 
World Bank (2008), Agnello et al. (2015) ... The results of the most recent analysis on 
the sample of EU advanced countries that was conducted by Duval, Furceri and Miethe 
(2018) confirm that reforms tend to occur during period of high unemployment, low 
growth or recessions/crises, supporting the crises induced reforms assumption. Also, the 
authors point out that political factors have an effect on reform implementation, even 
though much smaller than economic factors. Further, Dias Da Silva, Givone and 
Sondermann (2017) analysed which factors had effect on structural reforms in 40 OECD 
and EU countries in a 1975-2013 period. Their results also confirmed crises induced 
reforms hypothesis, in addition with some further factors that proved to be significant 
drivers of reforms, i.e. external pressure, reforms sequencing, government fragmentation 
and initial structural conditions. Agnello et al. (2015), on a sample of 60 developed and 
developing countries in 1980-2005 period, explored the effects of various crises on the 
probability of the implementation of structural reforms, showing that product market 
reforms are accelerated by political fractionalisation (in the group of OECD countries), 
and by the increased income inequality (in a group of non-OECD countries). 
 The key question in this paper is on the drivers behind different patterns of 
reforms in various countries groups in EU which evidently resulted in divergent quality 
of business environment. Specifically, taking into consideration characteristics of 
countries that have undertaken reforms, and based on previous analyses, economic and 
political variables are tested as factors of reforms in the following lines. 
 
3.1. Model and data 
 Following the approach applied in previous studies, as a dependent reform 
variable, we use the sub-pillar Business Regulation from the Fraser Institute database. 
This index ranges from 0 to 10, with the change towards the higher level of the index 
indicating more intense reform activity. In some studies reform shock can be also 
identified as a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when a reform shock is 
observed, and 0 otherwise (see Bordon, Ebeke & Shirono, 2018).  
 After reviewing the literature and comparing the possible methods for the 
analysis as well as taking into consideration the characteristics of the used database, the 
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and by the increased income inequality (in a group of non-OECD countries). 
 The key question in this paper is on the drivers behind different patterns of 
reforms in various countries groups in EU which evidently resulted in divergent quality 
of business environment. Specifically, taking into consideration characteristics of 
countries that have undertaken reforms, and based on previous analyses, economic and 
political variables are tested as factors of reforms in the following lines. 
 
3.1. Model and data 
 Following the approach applied in previous studies, as a dependent reform 
variable, we use the sub-pillar Business Regulation from the Fraser Institute database. 
This index ranges from 0 to 10, with the change towards the higher level of the index 
indicating more intense reform activity. In some studies reform shock can be also 
identified as a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when a reform shock is 
observed, and 0 otherwise (see Bordon, Ebeke & Shirono, 2018).  
 After reviewing the literature and comparing the possible methods for the 
analysis as well as taking into consideration the characteristics of the used database, the 
panel regression analysis was chosen. More precisely, econometric analysis is performed 
using the dynamic panel model based on the Arellano – Bond (1991) generalised method 
of moments (GMM). This estimator is widely used for the analysis of linear relationship 
with the dynamic dependent variable that is dependent on its own past values, as well as 
in a situation in which the independent variables are not strictly exogenous which is the 
case in our model. In addition, the estimator considers the specificity of each observed 
unit and allows for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within the unit of observation, 
but not across them (Roodman, 2009). The dependent reform variable is regressed on a 
set of independent variables, the selection of which was carried out on the basis of a 
detailed review of the existing scientific literature in the field of political economy of 
reform. The model can be written as follows:  
itiitKitiit uvxreformreform ++++= −  1, , i = 1,…, N, t = 1,…, T,            (1)  
where N is the number of observation units, T is the number of periods, itreform  stands 
for the value of the dependent variable i in the period t, the parameter   is the constant, 
  is the scalar, 1, −tireform  is the one-period-lagged (one year) dependent variable (for 
the same country), itKit xx ,...,1 are the K of independent variables for the member state i 
during the period t (i.e. 1K x  je  iK  x 1 je ' itx ), iv is the fixed element or random 
error for the unit of observation, and itu  the error term. It is assumed that all variables 
itx  are strictly exogenous and uncorrelated with any itu . The lagged value of a dependent 
variable (one-period lag) is used as an instrumental variable. The model is estimated with 
the robust standard errors. The test for the autocorrelation in residuals is performed using 
the m1 and m2 tests5. Table 1 summarizes the list of indicators used, the expected effects 









                                                          
5 The null hypothesis of the 1m  test assumes the absence of a first-order autocorrelation 
between differenced residuals, and the null hypothesis of the 2m  test assumes the 
absence of a second-order autocorrelation between differenced residuals.  
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reformt-1 lagged dependent 
variable 
positive Economic Freedom of the 
World (Fraser Institute) 
efw overall index of 
economic freedom 
positive Economic Freedom of the 
World (Fraser Institute) 
unemp unemployment rate  positive or 
negative 
Eurostat 
left ideology of government 
(dummy variable, value 
1=left, 0=all other cases) 
negative Database of Political 
Institutions (Scartascini, 
Cesi and Keefer, 2018) 
elec political cycles (years 
before the election year) 
positive or 
negative 
Database of Political 
Institutions (Scartascini, 




herfgov index equals 1 
and with coalition 
governments it takes a 
value between 0 and 16) 
positive Database of Political 
Institutions (Scartascini, 
Cesi and Keefer, 2018) 
mature government maturity 
(tenure in office) 
positive Database of Political 
Institutions (Scartascini, 
Cesi and Keefer, 2018) 
net_lend general government net 





global external (international) 
influence  
positive KOFI index of 
globalisation (Savina et al., 
2019) 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
efw 532 7.557707 .5249801 4.11 8.52 
reform 517 7.207696 .8988794 4.84483 9.024955 
global 532 80.50781 7.069845 49.23808 90.64874 
unemp 532 9.0915 4.554659 0 27.475 
mature 531 3.922787 2.82303 1 18 
left 532 .3082707 .4622136 0 1 
                                                          
6 As in Gregorini and Longoni (2010) and Vučković and Basarac Sertić (2013) 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
efw 532 7.557707 .5249801 4.11 8.52 
reform 517 7.207696 .8988794 4.84483 9.024955 
global 532 80.50781 7.069845 49.23808 90.64874 
unemp 532 9.0915 4.554659 0 27.475 
mature 531 3.922787 2.82303 1 18 
left 532 .3082707 .4622136 0 1 
                                                          
6 As in Gregorini and Longoni (2010) and Vučković and Basarac Sertić (2013) 
herfgov 531 .6315786 .255903 .181002 1 
net_lend 531 -2.721281 3.603135 -32.1 6.9 
elec 531 .259887 .438986 0 1 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
3.2. Results   
Table 3 shows the results of the estimated impact of the selected variables on 
business environment reforms in the EU28 member states, as well as in the sub-groups of 
old (EU15) and new (NMS13) EU member states. The tests for first- and second-order 
autocorrelation yield the expected results, i.e. the tests do not reject the absence of second-
order autocorrelation7 among differenced residuals. The model was estimated with robust 
standard errors. The lagged dependent variable is statistically significant and has a 
positive sign in all three models.  
For EU28 countries, the results show that the variables unemp, elect-1, mature, 
net_lend, left and efw are statistically significant. Precisely, business environment reforms 
in analysed EU member states are influenced by initial structural conditions, economic 
performance in countries (proxied by unemployment), electoral cycles, government 
maturity, government budget balance and overall economic freedom index. Higher 
unemployment is positively correlated with reform activities, indicating that the reforms 
are implemented more during a deteriorating economic situation (as in Drazen and 
Easterly, 2001). Furthermore, more mature governments are those implementing reforms 
- mature governments implement more reforms due to the fact that there is a certain period 
of time in which the political and administrative obstacles have to be overcome (as in Høj 
et al. (2006)). Next, an increase in the overall economic freedom is in positive and an 
increase in government deficit is in negative relation with reforms. The effect of fiscal 
policy was tested using the data on budget deficit because poor public finances can limit 
governments in implementing reforms as measures to compensate potential losers need 
to be financed from the state budget, and they often decide to direct resources on fiscal 
consolidation rather than on structural reforms (Tompson and Dang, 2010). Finally, the 
analysis shows that political cycles also have a statistically significant impact on the 
implementation of reforms in EU28 countries, where a result that reforms are 
implemented in a year prior to elections could be an indicator of opportunistic behaviour 
of politicians and fulfilling their own short-term interests since, with the approaching date 
of the election, they could implement rather popular reforms. The result that shows that 
left-oriented governments implement business environment reforms is in line with 
reasoning that as they attach greater weight to equity, the negative coefficient would be 
rather expected with the reform of the labour market than for the product market reforms 
which are analysed here (see Castanheira et al., 2006). However, the variable capturing 
the government fragmentation did not turn out significant in neither of models.  
 
 
                                                          
7 Despite the existence of the first order autocorrelation but with no second-order 
autocorrelation, GMM estimates are consistent (Arellano and Bond, 1991).  
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Table 3. Results of dynamic panel model  
Source: Author’s calculation 
Note: *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at levels of 10%, 5% and 1%; p-values 
are in brackets; Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on countries in brackets 
 
 (1) (1) (2) 
 EU28 EU13 (NMS) EU15 
    
reformt-1 0.704*** 0.644*** 0.683*** 
 (0.0586) (0.080) (0.058) 
unemp 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
mature 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
left 0.015* 0.024* 0.015 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.0119) 
net_lend -0.004*** -0.001 -0.005*** 









 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
t-2 0.011 0.019** 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
t-3 0.006 0.013 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) 
t-4 0.002 0.011 -0.006 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
herfgov -0.006 0.014 -0.020 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.027) 
efw 0.770*** 0.839*** 0.902*** 
 (0.233) (0.188) (0.300) 
global 0.191 0.089 0.644** 
 (0.130) (0.164) (0.268) 
    
Observations 360 165 195 
Number of countries 28 13 15 
Arellano Bond test 
for AR(1) (p-values) 
Arellano Bond test 
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In the second model analysing the determinants of reforms in new member states 
(NMS11), the results show that, besides lagged dependent variable, unemp, mature, left 
elec t-1, elec t-2 and efw are statistically significant. The results show that reforms are 
implemented in times of unemployment growth, two years’ prior elections, with an 
increase in maturity, in countries with more economic freedom in general and by the left-
wing governments. Finally, in the cluster of old (EU15) countries, the results show that 
the reformt-1, unemp, mature, net_lend, global and efw are statistically significant. Beside 
the variables that were significant in the first model and minus the ideology of 




4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Results of the empirical analysis performed for the EU countries in the period 
from 1995 to 2017 confirm that business environment reforms are a complex process 
which depends on a number of economic and institutional factors.  We contribute to the 
existing research through the analysis of explanatory factors of reforms in EU countries 
with special emphasis on the difference between old and new EU member states which 
has implications for future avenues of research within this research area. The obtained 
results are in line with previous research, i.e. Duval, Furceri and Miethe (2018) as well as 
with Dias da Silva, Givone and Sondermann (2017) who both showed that in EU and 
OECD countries reforms tend to occur during period of high unemployment, supporting 
the crisis induced reform hypothesis. Also, Duval, Furceri and Miethe (2018) point out 
that political factors have much smaller effect than economic factors. A difference in our 
analysis is that for the group of NMS the opposite is true, i.e. that political factors have 
larger effect than economic factors. In addition to crises variable, Dias da Silva, Givone 
and Sondermann (2017) also showed that external pressure, reforms sequencing, 
government fragmentation and initial structural conditions have a significant effect on 
reforms in various areas, including the business environment. 
 One of the directions for future research is seen in the analysis of some more of 
unpopular reforms such as the reforms in labour market or in health sector. Also, it would 
be advisable to test the obtained results on some other available indicators and using 
alternative methods. In addition, this type of research is also of great importance for future 
research on the impact of reforms on various economic outcomes, since it has been shown 
that the specific characteristics of countries should be considered in the process of 
designing various reform programmes, and no “one size fits all” approach could be 
followed. 
However, the obtained results should be interpreted with caution considering all 
of the limitations of the research such as endogeneity, the sample size and time period. 
The main objective is to encourage further discussions in this research area and 
additionally highlight what Bergsten and Williamson (1994:4) already stressed:  that 
although there is no set of rules that could provide some kind of the manual for all 
countries in all circumstances, any guidelines that result from detailed examination of 
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specific processes in individual countries could be helpful to policy-makers and 
economists. Thus, the research conducted in this paper could serve as one of among many 
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ODREDNICE REFORMI POSLOVNOG OKRUŽENJA: POSTOJI LI 








U radu je provedena empirijska analiza čimbenika reformi poslovnog okruženja. 
Preciznije, primjenom analize panel podataka, u radu se istražuju učinci 
makroekonomskih uvjeta, političkih institucija i međunarodnih čimbenika na reforme 
poslovnog okruženja. Ekonometrijska analiza provedena je na uzorku 28 država članica 
Europske unije za razdoblje od 1995. do 2017. godine. Osim toga, grupiranjem zemalja 
na nove i stare države članice EU provedena je posebna analiza za ta dva uzorka. 
Dobiveni rezultati pokazuju da su reforme poslovnog okruženja pod utjecajem niza 
čimbenika, ali i da se značajnost čimbenika razlikuje među starim i novim državama 
članicama EU. 
Ključne riječi: poslovno okruženje; reforme tržišta proizvoda; EU; NMS, 
EU15. 
  
